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1 
Understanding the selection processes of public research projects in agriculture: the role 
of scientific merit 
1. Introduction  
Public expenditure towards agricultural research is one of the main sources of productivity 
growth and enhances environmental sustainability in both developing as well as developed 
economies (Hsu et al., 2003; Renkow and Byerlee, 2010; Sparger et al., 2013)1.  Global public 
research and development (R&D) expenditure towards agriculture grew only modestly in the 
1990s, and increased by 22% during the period 2000-2008, with substantial increases in China 
and India accounting for close to half of this global increase. On the other hand, the growth rate 
of public agricultural R&D investments slowed down between 2000-2008 for high-income 
countries (Beintema et al., 2012), even though their research intensity ratio (i.e. agricultural 
spending relative to agricultural gross domestic product) had been increasing steadily since the 
early 1980s2.  
In the European Union (EU) public agricultural research funding has been progressively 
linked to regional policy, especially via rural development measures (Labarthe and Laurent, 
2013). Therefore, given that the rate of public support for agricultural research in developed 
countries grows slowly (Alston et al., 1998; Beintema et al., 2012; Pardey et al., 2006; Pardey 
and Beintema, 2001; Spielman and von Grebmer, 2004), understanding how regional public 
authorities select and fund agricultural research projects is becoming a key issue for policy-
makers and researchers alike (Huffman and Evenson, 2006a; Huffman and Evenson, 2006b; 
Huffman and Just, 1994, 1999a, 2000).  
1 While in developing economies the majority of R&D expenditure originates from public sources, in developed 
economies private contributions to agricultural R&D are predominant (Piesse et al., 2010). However, in these 
economies public funds are still a relevant source of support for agricultural R&D activities, especially towards 
more fundamental research (Piesse et al., 2010). 
2 Beintema et al. (2012) present a detailed assessment of public agricultural R&D spending at the global level, 
suggesting that 2008 is the latest year for which sufficiently reliable data are available. 
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Regional public authorities are increasingly concerned with both determining the 
optimal amount to allocate to research funds, as well as with designing appropriate mechanisms 
to select research projects (Huffman and Evenson, 2006b; Huffman and Just, 1994, 1999a; 
Pardey et al., 2006; Pardey and Beintema, 2001; Spielman and von Grebmer, 2004). To match 
the increased policy relevance, there is a growing body of academic literature that investigates 
how to best organize the distribution of public funds in agricultural research (Alston et al., 1995; 
Huffman and Just, 1994, 1999a, 2000; Just and Huffman, 1992). Indeed, improved 
understanding of the factors affecting the selection and funding processes applied by regional 
public authorities to allocate agricultural research funds, will be able to further inform the 
discussion on policy measures to be implemented in this domain.  
A major insight from the abovementioned stream of research is that the effectiveness of 
the provision of public funds to research activities hinges upon the funding mechanisms 
employed (Alston et al., 1998; Braun, 2003; Huffman and Just, 1999b; Potì and Reale, 2007; 
Ruttan, 2001; Tabor et al., 1998)3. Most public funding authorities employ a portfolio of 
funding systems with changing environments and emerging needs, which guides the choice of 
system per case (Lepori, 2011). Compared to different systems4, the so-called “peer-reviewed 
competitive grant program”, in which researchers compete with each other to receive funds, is 
becoming more popular (Hoekman et al., 2012; Huffman and Evenson, 2006a; Huffman and 
Just, 2000). In principle, competitive grants are: more responsive to current needs; provide 
increased flexibility; offer increased potential to attract the best talent through open 
competition; can lead to more efficient use of research resources since they rely on professional 
and peer review; and can better balance and complement other research resources and programs 
(Alston and Pardey, 1996).  
3 Dalrymple (2002) provides a comprehensive review of the historical literature about the social returns to research 
investments in the public and private domain. 
4 See Huffman and Just (2000) for a detailed discussion of the different funding allocation mechanisms. 
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In reality, though, competing for grants can be time-consuming and expensive, and, 
perhaps more importantly, it can also suffer from external pressures. Such pressures introduce 
different forms of favouritism in the decision process, and can eventually lead to suboptimal 
allocation of funds. As such, peer review tends to rely heavily on “old-boy” networks (Alston 
and Pardey, 1996; Alston et al., 2010). Moreover, competitive grants are usually oriented 
towards short term projects (3 to 5 years) despite the fact that agricultural research often requires 
long term funding (i.e. longer than 5 years for breeding programs). 
In the “peer reviewed” system, the organizer of the grant competition invites interested 
parties to submit their research proposals through public calls that set the rules of the game. 
Research project proposals submitted by groups of researchers are then typically selected by a 
panel of (academic) researchers and/or experts (reviewers), after which they evaluate the 
proposals and award funding to those that they deem to be the best (Jayasinghe et al., 2001). In 
the most common setting, panels composed of individuals both external and internal to the 
funding agency, judge the proposals in different stages of the process. These reviewers are often 
experts from academia or research institutes, as well as bureaucrats whose main goal tends to 
be to check the congruency between the proposals and the submission criteria (Jayasinghe et 
al., 2001). 
Empirical work on the factors that allow a given proposal to be funded has established 
that the chances of funding depend, among others, on the scientific merit (i.e. academic quality 
of the proposal), the suitability of the research topic, its societal impact, the proposing team, 
and the applicant(s)’ attributes such as academic affiliation, gender, and age (Ballesteros and 
Rico, 2001; Cole et al., 1981; Grimpe, 2012; Hoekman et al., 2012; Rasmussen et al., 2006; 
Reinhart, 2009; Santamaría et al., 2010; Viner et al., 2004). From these studies, two 
observations are of particular interest within the present work.  
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Firstly, limited attention has been given to specific funding systems for agricultural 
projects (the study by Rasmussen et al. (2006) on organic agriculture funding is an exception 
to this). Given the high investment returns on agricultural research, this lack of relevant work 
is surprising (Alston et al., 2000; Huffman and Evenson, 2006b). Along the same lines, the 
share of public research funds going into agricultural research is generally larger than the share 
sourced from private funds. This is primarily a response to the fact that the agricultural private 
sector is unlikely to sustain a flow of funds above the socially optimal level (Alston and Pardey, 
1996), which in turn occurs because it consists of a large number of small businesses with 
limited access to financial means and limited internal R&D capabilities (Alston et al., 1998; 
Huffman and Just, 2000; Pardey and Beintema, 2001). Thus, public funds tend to be the primary 
means to sustain an adequate flow of investments in agricultural research.  
Secondly, the focus of research in this domain has mostly been on the demand side for 
the funds, e.g. on attributes of the proposal and the proposing team, leaving the supply side 
largely unexamined. In general terms this means that we know relatively little about how 
attributes of the reviewers (i.e. academic experts and/or bureaucrats) as well as the reviewing 
team can affect the funding outcome of any given submitted proposal. In similar settings, such 
as the allocation of research funding to researchers, evidence suggests that the supply side can 
also be influential in shaping the distribution of funds (Alston et al., 1998; Bornmann and 
Daniel, 2007; Cole et al., 1977; Jayasinghe et al., 2001; Laudel, 2006; Marsh et al., 2009; 
Rasmussen et al., 2006). Accordingly, several candidate factors can explain the allocation of 
research funds by regional authorities. For example, the reviewing team’s gender composition, 
as well as its overall tendency to reject or approve proposals, are relevant factors if we take into 
account concerns about favouritism and opportunistic behaviour (Sonnert, 1995).  
These considerations prompted us to examine how both demand and supply factors can 
influence the allocation of agricultural funds provided by regional governments. More 
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specifically, we focus on understanding to what extent factors other than scientific quality and 
merit, influence the outcome of the selection and funding of agricultural research project 
proposals. 
As our case study, we analyse agricultural research funds allocated in the Emilia-
Romagna Region (ERR) in Italy. ERR presents an interesting template for our study for a 
number of reasons. Namely, the “competitive grant” fund allocation procedure followed by the 
regional authorities at ERR, greatly resembles the procedures followed by many other regional 
public authorities in Europe (see for instance the cases described in Bornmann and Daniel, 
2006; Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005; Garcia and Menéndez, 2004; Henningsen et al., 2012), 
which adds to the generalizability of our results. Furthermore, the large number and diversity 
of funded projects by ERR (on average, from 2001 to 2006, €12 million was awarded annually, 
spread over 100 proposals), indicates that a number of factors can play a role in determining 
which proposal receives funding.  
To empirically study the allocation of agricultural research funds of ERR, we were 
provided with a rich dataset. The dataset not only reports information on both award winners 
and submitted proposals that did not receive funding, but also reports the amount of funding 
allocated to each proposal. Drawing from this dataset, we use a Heckman selection model to 
study the amount received per proposal, while accounting for potential selection bias that could 
result from examining award winners’ submissions only. Furthermore, the dataset reports 
features of the proposals’ applicants, as well as features of the team that reviewed the proposal. 
Accordingly, we construct a novel empirical model that simultaneously measures the effects of 
both supply and demand attributes on the likelihood that a proposal gets funds, as well as on 
the amount it receives if it is funded.  
We proceed with the rest of the paper as follows: in the next section we present our 
theoretical expectations for the factors that shape the allocation of research funds. In Section 3 
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we elucidate the details of the funding procedure in ERR. In Section 4 we present our data and 
empirical methodology. In Section 5 we present our results, after which we conclude in Section 
6.  
2. Factors affecting the selection of research projects in agriculture 
Several strands of literature analyse the selection process for different research projects 
based on a peer-review mechanism (Ballesteros and Rico, 2001; Grimpe, 2012; Hoekman et 
al., 2012; Rasmussen et al., 2006; Santamaría et al., 2010; Viner et al., 2004). A peer-review 
mechanism is meant to improve the quality of the selection process because it is mainly based 
on rewarding the scientific quality and merit of the research project proposals. More than any 
other stakeholder, peer reviewers are expected to have the scientific know-how and experience 
that qualifies them to appropriately approximate the potential outcomes of research proposals, 
thus reducing the ex-ante uncertainty related to the selection and funding mechanism (Huffman 
and Just, 2000). As a result, under a peer review mechanism, research proposals with high(er) 
scientific quality and merit, as compared to lesser proposals in terms of scientific quality, should 
be more likely to be selected and receive more funds.  
However, since peer review panels can be vulnerable to politicisation, favouritism, and 
strategic manoeuvring, this expectation has been often challenged, (Bornmann and Daniel, 
2005, 2007; Viner et al., 2004). Indeed, an increasing number of academic publications point 
out that the scientific quality or merit of a research project might not be the most decisive factor 
in determining a given proposal’s fate. For instance, Viner et al. (2004) highlight the presence 
of the so-called ‘Matthew Effect’, under which greater recognition is often accorded to projects 
of established scientists, whilst recognition is withheld from those yet to make their mark. This 
is also described as “accumulative advantage”, to indicate the process in which the initial social 
status of a scientist/researcher influences their probability of obtaining recognition for their 
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work (e.g. being funded a research project) (Viner et al., 2004). Therefore, beyond scientific 
merit, attributes of the applicant such as reputation (i.e. being successful in prior funding 
applications) and scientific status (e.g. often proxied by an objective measure of the actual 
competence and quality such as the h-index), and/or influence (e.g. the type of research 
institution endorsing/supporting the applicant) may matter as well (Bertocchi et al., 2014; 
Bornmann and Daniel, 2005, 2007; Materia and Esposti, 2009; Reinhart, 2009; Viner et al., 
2004).  
Other critics of the peer-review mechanism argue that the attributes of the reviewers 
may also be relevant in explaining the fate of a given proposal. For example, Bornmann and 
Daniel (2005) point out that (i) reviewers rarely reach a unified agreement, often because of 
relations of power or hierarchy between them, which can impact the reliability of the peer 
review mechanism; (ii) reviewer’s recommendations can be biased since they may be 
influenced by personal attributes of the applicants (e.g. gender) or of the reviewers themselves. 
Both critiques imply that a fruitful avenue for improved understanding of the selection and 
funding of research proposals is the investigation of how attributes of the team of reviewers, as 
well as the matching between the attributes of the reviewers and the applicants, can influence 
the fate of a given proposal (Bornmann and Daniel, 2005, 2007; Hartmann and Neidhardt, 1990; 
Hodgson, 1997; Rasmussen et al., 2006; Reinhart, 2009). 
Confronted with such considerations, in this paper we empirically examine how 
scientific quality and merit, along with other external factors, influence the outcome of the 
selection and funding of agricultural research project proposals. We define the potential 
influences of those factors in the selection and funding process as “biases” of the peer-review 
mechanism. Although different sources of biases are commonly identified and classified in the 
literature, one principal problem is the general lack of studies where reviewer biases are directly 
studied in the natural setting of actual referee evaluations (Baxt et al., 1998; Bornmann and 
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Daniel, 2005). This scarcity of relevant studies, makes it difficult to establish with certainty 
whether research projects from a particular group of scientists receive better reviews/rewards 
(and thus has a higher approval rate) due to biases in the review and decision-making procedure, 
or if favourable review and greater success in the selection procedure is truly a consequence of 
the scientific merit of the corresponding group of applicants (Bornmann and Daniel, 2005). 
Furthermore, only a handful of studies address concerns directly linked to the reviewers 
themselves rather than attributes of the applicant(s), or the project (Bornmann and Daniel, 2007; 
Jayasinghe et al., 2001). Thus, an all-encompassing analysis of the role of these “biasing” 
factors in the selection process of research projects based on peer review mechanisms is still 
lacking (Bornmann and Daniel, 2007; Jayasinghe et al., 2001). Taking these gaps into account, 
this paper contributes to the existing literature by highlighting and empirically investigating the 
role of a multitude of factors, on top of scientific merit or quality in a peer review mechanism, 
that can influence the selection and funding of agricultural research projects. More specifically, 
we analyse both the selection of projects and the funding amount allocated to each project.  
Only a few other papers have jointly looked at those decisions before (Ballesteros and 
Rico, 2001; Santamaría et al., 2010; Viner et al., 2004) while the small number of relevant 
contributions calls for more work on the topic. Contrary to previous work (Reinhart, 2009), we 
do not only analyse how the selection and funding process is influenced by attributes of the 
applicants themselves, but also by attributes of the team of reviewers. Furthermore, in line with 
only a limited number of previous works (Bornmann and Daniel, 2007; Jayasinghe et al., 2001; 
Jayasinghe et al., 2003), in the analysis we incorporate attributes of the reviewers and the 
reviewing team as a whole. These attributes include the gender composition of the reviewing 
team, as well as the past history of the team in rejecting and approving applications (Sonnert, 
1995).  
9 
In all, we expect that taking into account these factors will improve our understanding 
of the peer review selection and funding processes of agricultural proposals with increased 
precision. As previously mentioned, to empirically address our research questions we focus on 
the case of the Emilia-Romagna region in Italy, details of which we present in the next section.  
3. The selection process adopted in the Emilia-Romagna Region 
The Emilia-Romagna Region (ERR) is one of Italy’s largest administrative regions and has 
been one of the front-runners for the manner in which “competitive grants” in agricultural 
research have been allocated in the last few decades (Materia and Esposti, 2009)5. 
In 1998, ERR became one of Italy’s first regional authorities to adopt a new regulation 
(Regional Law (R.L.) 28/98) aimed at re-organizing the process of awarding research funding 
towards more competitive principles. The new regulation introduced a “peer review process” 
for the evaluation of grant proposals, in which applicants submit proposals according to a 
prescribed format. They can submit to one of following three general categories: (i) “study, 
research and experimentation” if the application refers to more scientific or research oriented 
activities; (ii) “technical assistance” or; (iii) “information, documentation and training” if the 
application refers to research dissemination activities. In the context of this paper we focus on 
the selection process for the first type of proposals. The research proposal selection and funding 
process used by ERR are described in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 about here (ERR selection process) 
In the first stage of the selection process, research proposals are checked against formal
eligibility criteria by regional administrative employees, and are then assigned to one or more 
5 Thus, ERR presents an interesting example of how regional authorities allocate “competitive grants”, and it 
resembles to a large degree the procedure followed by other regional public authorities in Europe (Bornmann 
and Daniel, 2006; Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005) 
10 
panels of at least three academics, which are to provide an independent scientific assessment. 
These academics are national experts, nominated by the regional authority on basis of their 
expertise, and are meant to complement the reviewers in the assessment of the proposals’ 
scientific merit. Each proposal is assigned to one specific panel of academics, with the same 
panel often assessing more than one project. Academic experts are asked to assess each proposal 
exclusively on the base of the degree of innovativeness, scientific and technical adequacy, 
clarity of the scientific objective, relevance of expected results, completeness of scientific 
information, and expected costs. After the academic reviews are completed, a panel of three 
reviewers (“triads of regional experts”) proceed with the decision making process by integrating 
academic evaluations with additional assessments (see Table A1), and thus decide the final 
admittance or rejection decision per each proposal (second stage in the selection process)6. 
Finally, these triads rank the proposals according to their scores, allocating grants until all 
regional funds intended for research activities are spent (similar to, for instance, the case 
described in Jayasinghe et al. (2001)).  
Note that within the text of the regional law, more relevance is given to some specific 
regional research organizations that ERR recognizes as key-actors in the implementation of the 
regional strategy on agricultural R&D. In the context of ERR, all these organizations act as 
innovation brokers (IB)7 because they coordinate and mediate the interaction between research 
providers and users (farmers, agri-food companies etc.). Moreover, it is worth noting that in 
2004, the regional regulation had been subject to a reform to simplify procedures and to align 
to new regional priorities in the research domain. As a result, some criteria that had been valid 
since 2000 were revised and merged, although the overall selection process did not change (see 
6 In the empirical part of our paper (Section 4 and 5), among the additional assessments that the triads assign, we 
zoom in on the effects of the suitability and integration of the project within the regional context. 
7 Innovation brokers are organizations, formally identified by the ERR, and aim to coordinate and facilitate 
interaction and cooperation between researchers and other stakeholders, mainly agri-food companies and/or 
entrepreneurs. As regulated by Regional Law (R.L.) 28/98, research grants through the competitive system are 
the sole source of funding for these organizations. They do not receive any extra-support from other national or 
regional authorities. 
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Appendix - Table A1). In our empirical strategy we take both the role of IBs as well as the 
reform of the regional regulation on research funding into account.  
4. Methods and procedures 
To empirically test the impact of scientific merit and attributes of the reviewing team on the 
allocation of research funds to a given proposal, we build a two-stage Heckman (1979) model. 
In the first stage we model the probability that a proposal receives funding as conditional on 
attributes of the proposal, the reviewing team, and other remaining factors we expect to 
influence the chances of funding. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 for proposals that 
are admitted to the second round, and 0 otherwise. In the second stage, we study the amount of 
funds received by proposals that are selected in the first stage. The allocation of funds is again 
regressed on measures of the scientific merit of the proposal, its suitability and integration with 
the regional context, the composition of the reviewing team, attributes of the applicants, and 
other factors including a vector of the expected value of the error term (so-called Inverse Mills 
Ratio)8. Employing the Heckman procedure allows us to control for the selection bias under 
which proposals that go past the first round are different from non-successful proposals in 
unobserved features. If such a proposition is indeed true, the proposals of the second round are 
indeed not randomly selected. The two-stage Heckman procedure addresses such potential 
selection bias, and thus adds to the robustness of our results.  
Table 1 about here  
8 Note that the elements of the design matrix X in the two estimated models are not identical. That is, a number 
of regressors are relevant only for explaining the receipt of a grant or the amount awarded but not both, as we 
explain in detail in the following discussion. As such, the former are included only in the first stage model and 
the latter only in the second stage model. 
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To capture the effect of the scientific merit of a given proposal on its progress in the reviewing 
process, we include a variable that measures the rating given by academic experts to each 
project (MERIT)9 in both models. The MERIT variable is calculated as the percentage of the 
score assigned to each project by the academic experts (as indicated by the ERR regulation10).  
More established or successful researchers may have better chances to attract (more) 
funds. This may hold because either their proposals truly reflect their qualities, or because 
funding agencies see them as more favourable. Given that we account for the quality of the 
proposal, our analysis includes the h-index of each principal investigator (PI) (H-INDEX) to 
account for the potential preference of funding sources towards more productive researchers. A 
positive sign for the associated coefficient would then suggest that they indeed present with a 
general inclination to fund proposals submitted from this cohort of researchers. We calculate 
the h-index of the PI at the year the project was submitted, and we use the SCOPUS database 
to source it. For projects with more than one principal investigator we average the h-index 
across PIs. In case a researcher is not listed in SCOPUS, or they do not have an h-index at the 
time the proposal was submitted, the variable takes the value of 0. The index is based on the set 
of the researchers’ most cited papers and the number of citations that they have received in 
other publications. Essentially, an h-index of say 7 means that a given researcher has 7 
publications with at least 7 citations, an h-index of say 15 means that a given researcher has 15 
publications with at least 15 citations and so on. Although there are some critics about the use 
of the h-index (e.g. it does not account for the number of authors of a paper, nor for the typical 
9 See Table A1 in the Appendix for a more detailed representation. 
10 As we noted in section 3, ERR funds three types of projects: research-, experimentation-, and technical assistance 
projects. For the analysis we focus on research- and experimentation projects. Primarily due to the change in law 
in 2004, the method of calculation and the evaluation criteria of the scientific merit score for the technical 
assistance projects differ considerably for projects applied before and after the change in legislature. Due to this, 
we focus on research and experimentation projects whose scientific merit score is consistently computed across 
the sample. Regardless, to check the robustness of our results while focusing solely on research and 
experimentation projects in unreported work, we built two additional models. In the first model we include all 
observations from all types of projects up to 2004, while in the second model we limit the analysis to observations 
after 2004. The estimates of these models yield qualitative similar results to those reported in Table 3, suggesting 
that the exclusion of technical assistance projects from the analysis does not hamper our empirical estimates. 
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number of citations in different fields), and about SCOPUS (e.g. it does not cover publications 
prior to 1996), the index is generally regarded as an objective measure of research achievement 
(Hirsch, 2005, 2007; Martin, 2015; Prathap, 2010).  
To capture the effect of how triads of regional experts assess the proposals they evaluate, 
we use the score they assigned to the project to reflect the overall suitability of the project within 
the regional context (SUITABILITY)11. We calculate this variable as the percentage of the score 
assigned to each project by the reviewers, as relative to the maximum potential score 
determined by the regulation. We expect that a higher score for this criterion will lead to 
increased probability of being selected.  
To approximate the attributes of the team of reviewers we include three independent 
variables in the analysis. The first variable measures the percentage of males in the group of 
reviewers (GENDERGROUP). Given the evidence that male reviewers tend to give lower 
ratings to proposals presented by male or female applicants (Sonnert, 1995), we expect a 
negative sign for this variable. The second variable measures the number of times the same 
group of reviewers had reviewed proposals before reviewing the proposal in question 
(TIMESGROUP). Based on extant findings we expect the ratings of reviewers to become more 
unfavourable for each additional previously reviewed application (Bornmann and Daniel, 2007; 
Jayasinghe et al., 2001). The third independent variable that enters the analysis aims to measure 
the number of times the same group of reviewers has previously provided a positive evaluation 
for projects (ANGEL). Although the membership in review panels is rotating, it is possible that 
the same group of three reviewers has worked together more than once. Under the premise that 
previous behaviour reflects future intention, we expect ANGEL to capture a general tendency 
11 Data limitations and inconsistency in the score systems before and after 2004 do not allow us to take into account 
the other criteria (C, D and E) used by reviewers. As showed in table A1, criteria C and D further specify elements 
already addressed by criterion B, while criterion E deals with features related to the project management. In our 
view their omission is not biasing the results when it comes to assess selection process (stage 1). They may have 
an impact in fine-tuning the estimates when it comes to co-financing decisions (stage 2). It is likely to expect that 
a project showing more detailed link to the regional priorities as well as showing more sounding management 
features may receive more funds. 
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for a certain group of reviewers to either favour or reject proposals (Bornmann and Daniel, 
2007; Piesse et al., 2010). As such, increasing values of the ANGEL variable should associate 
with both increased chances for project approval as well as an increase in amount of funds12. 
To complement the independent variables in explaining the chances of success for a 
proposal, we included a number of additional regressors in the analysis, as we present below. 
Besides the scientific merit of a given proposal and its impact in terms of suitability for the 
regional programming and productive system, we expect other attributes of a proposal to 
influence its chances of being funded, as well as the amount of this funding. We include a 
variable that measures the total amount of funds requested by the project as the percentage of 
the total amount of funds provided by the funding agency for the year in question (COST). 
Proposals that require larger amounts may be at a disadvantage in attracting funds because of 
limited fund availability. Alternatively, more financially demanding projects may present 
broader or richer research outcomes, which could then indicate increased chances of success. 
Given that a priori extant literature does not allow us to disentangle these two opposing effects, 
we do not formulate any priors for the expected sign of the COST variable. Next, we include a 
dummy variable for projects related to vegetable production (VEG) to account for the general 
tendency of the Emilia Romagna region to allocate funds in that sector. We therefore expect a 
positive sign for the VEG variable. Finally, we include a control variable to reflect the duration 
of the proposed project (MONTHS). This variable can approximate the unobservable effort and 
12 In order to check whether the attributes of the triads of regional reviewers exert any bias on the score they assign 
to “suitability”, we built two new variables to show the interaction between features of the triads, and the score 
assigned to suitability. To evaluate the effect of the regional reviewers’ gender on this score, we built the interaction 
term b_gendergroup, which is the product of the suitability variable and the variable representing the gender of 
the (triads of) regional reviewers. To evaluate whether the fact that the same reviewing team has been an angel in 
the past has had any influence on the score given to suitability we create the b_angel variable, which is the product 
between the two corresponding variables. When we include these variables in the baseline specification, their 
coefficients are statistically insignificant (results are available upon request). These results suggest that the 
attributes of the regional reviewers do not exert any effect on the score they assign to suitability.  Because the 
evaluation of the merit of a given proposal is not necessarily objective (Wennerås and Wold, 1997) we investigated 
the possibility to conduct a similar exercise for MERIT. However, this was not possible because we do not possess 
full information about personal attributes for the majority of the academics that play a role in the first stage of the 
selection.  
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commitment of the researchers. Added to this, it can also indicate the extent to which the project 
relies on fundamental research, which typically is lengthy with uncertain outcomes. While we 
expect the commitment of the researchers to increase the chance of a given proposal to succeed 
in the review process, the uncertain outcomes of fundamental research may discourage the 
funding agency to allocate funds. Accordingly, we do not form priors for the sign of the 
MONTHS variable. 
With regard to attributes of the applicant, we include four variables. To approximate the 
experience of the applicants, in the model of the first round we include a variable that measures 
the number of projects that had been granted previously to the applicants (SUCCESSBEF). For 
the model of the second round, we calculate the total amount of funds that has been awarded to 
the applicants in the past (SUMBEF)13. We expect our measures of previous success to relate 
positively with both the chance of receiving a grant and the size of that grant. We base this 
expectation mainly on the cumulative advantages that repeat winners often realize (Viner et al. 
2004). The third control variable that relates to attributes of the applicant is a proxy of power. 
As discussed previously, regional innovation brokers (IBs) can be in an advantageous position 
in attracting research funds because their role as mediator between research and practice is 
explicitly recognized by ERR. By extension, we include a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the applicant organization is an IB, 0 otherwise, and expect a positive sign for the 
associated coefficient (IB). Finally, we include a dummy variable that measures the percentage 
of a proposal’s principal investigators (PIs) that are male (MALEPI). Previous evidence 
suggests that male PIs are often better off in peer review processes (Bornmann and Daniel, 
13 Note that both SUCCESSBEF and SUMBEF are calculated by counting the number of successful projects as 
well as their sum within the sample at hand (2001-2006). Such a construction scheme could, in principle, only 
underestimate the success measures of proponents that had approved proposals in the early periods of the 
sample. A detailed inspection of our data revealed that cases of one-time winners were relatively rare for the 
2001-2006 period. We do not have any a priori reasoning for similar trends before 2001. Nevertheless, the 
coefficients of those variables should be interpreted with caution.  
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2005, 2007; Jayasinghe et al., 2001; Reinhart, 2009), and as a result, we expect a positive sign 
for MALEPI.  
To evaluate whether the effect of the applicants’ gender (MALEPI) on the success of 
the proposed project is mediated by the gender of the reviewers (GENDERGROUP), we include 
an interaction term that is the product of these two variables (GENDER_INTER). We employ 
this variable to account for the case in which male or female reviewers systematically provide 
a biased recommendation to female or male applicants respectively (Bornmann and Daniel, 
2007; Jayasinghe et al., 2001; Jayasinghe et al., 2003; Sonnert, 1995). Along the same lines, we 
include an interaction term that is the product of ANGEL and TIMESGROUP (ANGEL_INTER) 
to evaluate whether the fact that the same reviewing team has been an angel in the past has an 
influence on the selection and funding of a project. We expect a positive effect, largely because 
previous studies have consistently shown that systematic tendencies of reviewers exist in the 
construction of judgements toward proposal evaluations during peer reviews (Bornmann and 
Daniel, 2007; Piesse et al., 2010)14. Finally, we include a variable that takes the value of 1 for 
proposals submitted after 2004, 0 before, which is the year that the change in regulation took 
place (YEAR). We expect a negative sign for this variable, which would reflect the declining 
trend in selecting and funding projects after the change in regulation. In sum, we build the 
following two empirical specifications:  
       = 	    +         +          +               +               +
             +         +        +       +              +           +
      _         + 	     _         +         +   
(1) 
14 In the context of manuscripts, Daniel (2010) showed that some reviewers could be classified as belonging to the 
category of “assassins” and some to the category of “zealots”.  
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      = 	    +         +          +               +               +
       +    	   +          +          + 	         +                +
        + 	       +   
(2) 
where SELECT equals 1 if the project is selected, 0 otherwise, and        is the amount of 
co-financing given by the region to the selected projects. 
5. Data Sources and Presentation 
To form the dependent, independent, and control variables we relied on proprietary data 
provided by the ERR. The dataset consists of 1221 project proposals (the observations) 
submitted during the 2001-2006 period. Out of the 1221 submitted proposals 589 projects were 
admitted to the second round of review. Those projects received approximately €75 million (on 
average more than €12 million per year), of which €59 million (about €10 million per year) 
were provided by the ERR. Both the number of projects that received funding, as well as the 
total amount of funding, decreased progressively over time; from 142 projects approved and 
funded in 2001 (56% of the total amount of projects submitted) to 70 in 2006 (41%), and from 
€15,5 to €8,3 million of total funding (of which 13,3 and 6,5 respectively, were provided by the 
ERR).
The regional research centres acting as intermediaries between science and practice (i.e., 
innovation brokers) presented 32% of the submitted projects (of which 48% were selected and 
funded), but also ventures and experimental companies (or laboratories) acquired a considerable 
amount of approvals for funding (21% and 15% of the total number of projects, respectively). 
Participation of other actors, more typically involved in research and experimentation projects, 
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was more limited: only 3% of the proposals were presented by universities15. The majority of 
the proposed and selected projects were research projects (55%), most of them coming from 
IBs. In terms of sectoral project distribution, 59% of the projects were related to the vegetable 
production sector, 22% to animal production, 14% to farm management and rural development, 
and the remaining 5% to environment and marketing. On average, for the period 2001-2006 the 
percentage of co-financing from the ERR to the selected projects remained high (80%), 
although it decreased somewhat from 86% in 2001 to 78% in 2006. 
Table 2 about here 
The average MERIT score (the percentage of points received by a given proposal out of 
the maximum number of points) for the proposals was 0.626 with a standard deviation of 0.141, 
which indicates that the variability in the MERIT scores was limited, with most proposals 
receiving a score of 0.72. Nevertheless, some proposals received the highest score of 0.95 (out 
of 1) and others the lowest score of 016. To report what Table 2 does not represent: the average 
MERIT score for proposals that went past the first round was 0.71, and the corresponding score 
for remaining proposals was 0.55; the average SUITABILITY score is 0.597 with a standard 
deviation of 0.216, indicating that the variability in this score was limited with most proposals 
receiving a score of 0.  
Of the 1217 projects for which it was possible to investigate the gender of the PI(s), 994 
projects were proposed by all-male teams while all-female teams proposed 147 projects. 905 of 
the 1221 projects were proposed before the change in the law (i.e., in the period 2001-2004), 
most of these in 2001 (253). Out of these 905, half were selected and funded. For the 316 
15 However, it should be noted that even when universities do not present projects directly, they are often involved 
in the proposals that are presented by other actors (mostly IBs). More often than not, their role encompasses the 
realization of the research activities once the projects have been approved. 
16 The fact that some projects received the lowest score alleviates concerns that only the better projects are 
submitted for funding. Along the same lines, the distribution of merit scores has a bell shaped curve, which, 
again, implies that projects of varying quality were submitted for funding. 
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projects proposed in 2005-2006, 136 were funded. Almost 59% (723) of the projects were 
related to vegetable production, 49% (356) of which were selected and funded. Roughly 32% 
of the projects were proposed by an IB, 52% of which received a positive evaluation and were 
funded. During the period 2001-2006, only 20 of the 1221 projects presented were evaluated 
by the same triad of reviewers (TIMESGROUP). 
6. Results 
Table 3 presents the estimates of the two-stage Heckman model. The fit statistics at the bottom 
of Table 3, suggest that the models indeed have explanatory power, while the statistical 
significance of the Mills Lambda indicates that the selected and not-selected projects for the 
second round do differ. Note that the multicollinearity condition index for both models is 
somewhat elevated, which could raise concerns about inference. As a robustness check, in 
Tables A3 and A4 we present stepwise models in which the index is well below the worrisome 
level of 100 (Belsley et al., 1980)17. For the most part, the results of those models are in line 
with the results presented in Table 3, adding to the robustness of our estimates. 
Table 3 about here 
In line with the expectation that the scientific merit of a given proposal is a strong predictor of 
the selection and financing of a given proposal, we find that an increase in MERIT score 
associates strongly with both the probability that a proposal goes to the second round, as well 
as with the amount of funding allocated to it. To illustrate, an increase of one unit in the score 
given to the MERIT index, is associated with an increase in funding level of the focal proposal 
by more than €100,000. To put the figure of €100,000 in perspective, recall that the average 
17 Along the same lines, we also present as Appendix Table A2 the correlation of the variables we use in the 
empirical analysis 
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amount allocated to successful proposals, as presented in Table 2, is roughly €102,500. The 
suitability of the project with the regional context is an additional driving factor in selecting 
projects: an increase of one unit for the score given to the SUITABILITY index, is associated 
with more than €135,000 increase in funding. On the other hand, the variable indicating the 
scientific status of the applicants (H-INDEX) is not statistically significant. This is an important 
observation indicating that more productive PIs do not experience any advantage when it comes 
to the selection and funding of their proposals. Combined, these results side with previous 
evidence on the importance of scientific quality of the research proposals (Reinhart, 2009), but 
not necessarily of the applicants.  
On top of the statistically significant and economically relevant effects of MERIT and 
SUITABILITY, we still find a number of other factors that influence the review panels’ 
selection of proposals and final allocation of funds. In particular, contrary to what we expected, 
the estimates indicate that proposals assessed by groups of male reviewers are both more likely 
to be selected for financing as well as to receive funds. In the same vein, the previous experience 
of reviewers’ panels is conducive to higher chances of a proposal being selected for funding. 
Furthermore, the general tendency of the same triad of reviewers to act as “angels”, is strongly 
linked to increased chances that a given proposal will be selected for funding. Therefore, in this 
case, we identify a potential source of bias. We note, however, that all the estimated coefficients 
that confirm influence of other factors on the selection and allocation processes, are 
significantly smaller than the MERIT and SUITABILITY coefficients.  
The results that describe attributes of the applicant(s) and the project suggest that 
“biases” about these two sources are rather limited. In particular, we find that the applicant’s 
number of previous successful projects is a statistically significant predictor of the probability 
that their current proposal is selected for funding. This finding potentially reflects the 
advantages conferred by accumulated experience and primarily relate to the effects of a learning 
21 
curve. Interestingly, proposals that originate from IBs do not seem to carry any advantage in 
terms of chances of being selected. This finding implies that the perceived power of the IB 
entities does not influence the chances of selection. The duration of the project, the funds 
awarded to the proposing team in the past, and the gender of the PI did not have explanatory 
power in either of the models. More financially demanding projects received additional funds 
but when compared to other projects they do not differ in the chances of being selected for the 
second round. Somewhat surprising given their popularity in ERR, projects related to vegetable 
production were less likely to receive funding. This implies that conditional on the remaining 
effects we control for, projects of that kind appear to be in a disadvantageous position. The 
negative sign of the year-dummy suggests, as expected, that the selection process became 
stricter after 2004 and that less funds were allocated to projects. 
The interaction terms reveal that while the gender of the PI is not relevant per se, male 
triads are more inclined to assign fewer funds to male PIs while female triads are more 
benevolent towards female researchers. Finally, the interaction term of the experience of the 
reviewers’ triad and its tendency to give positive evaluations revealed an unexpected effect, 
even though only marginally statistically significant: less funding is awarded to proposals that 
were assessed by reviewing teams with more experience in working together and having 
assessed more proposals positively.  
7. Conclusion 
Presently, a large body of research has been devoted to analysing the peer review processes by 
which (panels of) reviewers evaluate proposals. The studies in this line of research have yielded 
valuable insights, focusing mainly on attributes of the applicants and the project under review. 
However, the manner in which attributes of the reviewers affect the outcome of peer reviews, 
as well as how these attributes interact with features of the project and the applicants, remains 
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largely unexplored. Against this background, in our work we conduct the following novel 
exercise: we study the fate of research proposals by linking attributes of the proposal, the 
applicants, and the reviewers on the probability that a proposal receives funding as well as, if 
successful, on the amount of funding it receives. Importantly, as far as we are aware, our study 
is among the first to investigate the role of scientific merit in peer review based selection process 
specifically for agricultural research projects. 
We base our analysis on projects submitted to the Emilia Romagna Region (ERR) in 
Italy, where information on its selection process have been systematically recorded from 2001 
to 2006. We employ a two-stage Heckman model that simultaneously assesses the role of 
different factors in the selection as well as funding phase. Our results on selection and funding 
of agricultural research activities of the ERR support the notion that scientific merit is a prime 
factor explaining selection and funding amount of agricultural research proposals. Also, the 
suitability of the proposed research projects with the regional context is a strong predictor for 
the outcome of the selection and funding processes. Notably, we find that more 
productive/successful researchers are not more likely to see their projects succeed in the peer 
review process, indicating that the status of the applicants does not influence the selection 
process. 
However, we also document other influencing factors that to a certain extent can be 
regarded as sources of biases. This may require further attention in order to improve selection 
and allocation processes, particularly in the context of the peer review based selection 
mechanism. More specifically, we discovered that research proposals assessed by groups of 
male reviewers are both more likely to be selected as well as to receive funds. Previous 
experience of reviewers’ triads also leads to higher chances of a proposal being selected for 
funding, albeit with a marginal effect. Moreover, the tendency of the same triad of reviewers to 
act as “angels” is strongly linked to increased chances that a given proposal is selected for 
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funding. Thus, “benevolent triads” are disproportionally and systematically selecting and 
funding more proposals than other triads. Finally, we reveal that gender composition of triads 
and their match with proponents’ gender matter too.  
In order to reduce those potential sources of biases, a more careful process of reviewers’ 
triads composition has to be considered by the funding agency. Selection biases due to triad 
composition may be reduced by more frequent rotation of the triad members, as well as by 
increasing the number of involved experts. One strategy could be to ask academic experts to 
use other features of the proposals and not only the scientific merit in the selection process. 
Also, biases could potentially be reduced if the identities of the applicants were anonymous 
during the review process. 
Our work is not without limitations. First and foremost, we treat the scientific merit 
scores as exogenous, and data limitations do not allow us an in depth investigation to find out 
whether the scores assigned to a given proposal depend on the reviewers. Still, when we test 
whether the suitability scores suffer from similar bias we do not find such evidence. Along the 
same lines, we did not investigate how the panels’ composition and rotation was determined. 
The underlying mechanisms that lead to the formation of the panels may be able to explain the 
decisions of those panels. Finally, our focus on agricultural projects may limit the 
generalizability of our results to other sectors.  
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Table 1. Description of the variables used in the analysis 
Variable Definition  
Dependent variables 
SELECT Probability that a proposal is selected and admitted to funding (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) in the first stage of the process 
COFIN Amount of funding received in the second stage of the process by proposals that have been selected in the first stage 
Explanatory variables 
MERIT Scientific merit of a given proposal as the percentage of the score assigned to each project by the academic experts on the maximum 
potential score as indicated by the ERR regulation  
H-INDEX Measure of the scientific status of the principal investigator as the h-index reported till the year of the presentation of each project 
(source: Scopus, www.scopus.com visited in July 2014-September 2014)  
SUITABILITY Suitability and integration of a given proposal to the regional context as the percentage of the score assigned to each project by the 
reviewers on the maximum potential score as indicated by the ERR regulation  
GENDERGROUP Percentage of males in the group of reviewers 
TIMESGROUP Number of times the same group of reviewers has reviewed proposals before the proposal in question 
ANGEL Number of times the same group of reviewers has provided a positive evaluation of projects in the past 
Control variables 
COST Total amount of funding requested by the project as a percentage of the total amount of funding provided by the Region for the year in 
question  
VEG Project related to vegetable production (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) 
MONTHS Duration of the proposed projects  
SUCCESSBEF Number of projects that had been granted previously to the proponent institution 
SUMBEF Total amount of funding that had been awarded to the proponent institution in the past 
IB Project proposed by regional research centers acting as intermediary between science and practice (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise) 
MALEPI Percentage of principal investigators in a given proposal that are male 
Interaction terms 
GENDER_INTER Interaction effect between the gender of the principal investigator and the gender of the group of reviewers  
ANGEL_INTER Interaction effect between the number of times a group of reviewers has reviewed proposals before and the number of times the same 
group has provided a positive evaluation on projects in the past  
Dummy for change in the law 
YEAR Year that the change in regulation took place (1 = 2005, 2006; 0 = otherwise) 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Mode (freq)
Dependent variables  
SELECT 1221 0.482 0.499 0 1 0 (632)
COFIN 1221 102466.6 117606.4 0 1228804 0 (8)
Explanatory variables 
MERIT 872 0.626 0.141 0 0.95 0.72 (15)
H-INDEX 1221 2.623 4.172 0 36 0 (642)
SUITABILITY 871 0.597 0.216 0 0.92 0 (81)
GENDERGROUP 1221 0.710 0.266 0 1 0.66 (511)
TIMESGROUP 1221 4.114 3.889 1 20 1 (359)
ANGEL 1221 0.482 0.425 0 1 0 (450)
Control variables 
COST 1221 0.798 1.011 0.029 16.045 0.74 (3)
VEG 1221 0.592 0.492 0 1 1 (723)
MONTHS 1221 21.320 11.139 0 50 12 (534)
SUCCESSBEF 1221 36.066 50.687 0 168 0 (396)
SUMBEF 1221 4402497 6430292 0 2.04e+07 0 (396)
IB 1221 0.319 0.466 0 1 0 (832)
MALEPI 1217 0.852 0.335 0 1 1 (994)
Interaction terms 
GENDER_INTER 1221 0.611 0.336 0 1 0.66 (433)
ANGEL_INTER 1221 2.011 2.853 0 20 0 (450)
Dummy for change in the law 
YEAR 1221 0.259 0.438 0 1 0 (905)
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Table 3. Determinants of project selection (stage I) and co-financing awarding (stage II): the Heckman selection model. Standard errors in 
parentheses  
Variable
Project selection (I stage) Co-financing (II stage) 
Coefficient Marginal effect   Coefficient 
Scientific merit (MERIT)   8.8308 2.6083 *** 99272 *** 
(1.1957) (0.3597) (25339.75) 
Scientific status of the principal investigator(s) (H-INDEX)  0.0170 0.0050 153.42 
(0.0196) (0.0057) (557.39) 
Suitability and integration with the regional context (SUITABILITY) 6.2701 1.8519 ***  136482 *** 
(0.9710) (0.2404) (24350.77) 
Percentage of males in the group of reviewers (GENDERGROUP) (b) 1.8853 0.5568 ** 36120.65 ** 
(0.8501) (0.2548) (14479) 
Number of times the same triad has reviewed projects before (TIMESGROUP) (c) 0.0769 0.0227 *** 
(0.0288) (0.0082) 
Number of times the triad has provided a positive evaluation in the past (ANGEL) (d) 5.8574 1.7300 ***   
(0.4621) (0.1878) 
Quota of funding requested on the total amount of funding provided by the Region that year (COST)  -0.0628 -0.0185 113850.2 *** 
(0.0803) (0.0238) (7137.2) 
Project related to vegetable production (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) (VEG)  -0.5364 -0.1653 ** -350.43 
(0.2128) (0.0695) (5430.8) 
Duration of the proposed projects (MONTHS) 205.91 
(212.97) 
Number of projects granted previously to the proponent institution (SUCCESSBEF) 0.0046 0.0013 ** 
(0.0021) (0.0006) 
Total amount of funding that had been awarded to the proponent institution in the past (SUMBEF)  -0.0002 
(0.0005) 
Project proposed by regional research centers acting as intermediary btw science and practice (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise) (IB) 0.2480 0.0747 1124.38 
(0.2216) (0.0693) (3626.1) 
Percentage of principal investigators in a given proposal that are male (MALEPI) (a)  0.8791 0.2596 13766.3 
(0.6956) (0.2056) (11103.7) 
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(continue table 3) 
Interaction among (a) and (b) (GENDER_INTER) -1.4473 -0.4274 -35803.7 ** 
(0.9525) (0.2815) (16669.2) 
Interaction among (c) and (d) (ANGEL_INTER) -0.1170 -0.0345 **   
(0.0491) (0.0147) 
Year that the change in regulation took place (1 = 2005, 2006; 0 = otherwise) (YEAR) -0.6492 -0.1687 *** -25469.98 *** 
(0.2420) (0.0580) (6343.67) 
Constant  -13.9244 *** -167188.9 *** 
(1.4331) (30284.5) 
Mills Lambda  12770.7 ** 
(5262.3) 
Observations:  868 411 
McFadden's Pseudo R2: 0.8027 0.8621 
Wald χ2 (12): 244.53 
Prob. > χ2: 0.0000 
Log-pseudolikelihood  -118.4768 
Multicollinearity condition number  49.7459 56.3188 
***, **,: statistically significant at 1% and 5% confidence level, respectively 
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APPENDIX  
Table A1. RL 28/98 Evaluation criteria during different years  
Evaluation criteria (2000) Evaluation criteria (2004) 
A. Technical and scientific validity
A1. Innovativeness  
A2. Cost of the organizational structure 
A3. Scientific and technical adequacy of the project (curricula and activities) 
A4. Description of the objectives 
A5. Description of the expected results 
A6. Completeness of technical-scientific information 
A. Technical and scientific validity
A1. Innovativeness  
A2. Cost of the organizational structure 
A3. Scientific and technical adequacy of the project 
A4. Description of the objectives 
A5. Description of the expected results 
A6. Completeness of technical-scientific information 
B. Suitability and Integration with the regional context 
B1. Integration between development interventions                            
B2. Vertical supply chain integration  
B3. Horizontal integration 
B4. Synergies and integration with other projects, completion of on-going projects or 
development projects initiated earlier 
B. Suitability and Integration with the regional context
B1. Integration between development interventions                           
B2. Vertical supply chain integration  
B3. Horizontal integration 
B4. Synergies and integration with other projects, development projects initiated 
earlier 
C. Adequacy with objectives and priorities of the regional programming C. Adequacy with objectives and priorities of the programming                        C1. Adequacy with objectives and priorities of the regional programming
D. Adequacy with objectives and priorities of the provincial programming 
D. Efficiency and socio-economic impact of the project
D1. Cost / benefit analysis 
D2. Socio-economic impact  
D3. Potential to affect the productive process 
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E. Efficiency and socio-economic impact of the project
E1. Cost / benefit analysis 
E2. Socio-economic impact (employment, income, improvement of the work quality of 
the agricultural entrepreneur, saving non-renewable resources, environment, human 
health, animal, welfare) 
E3. Potential to affect the productive process 
E - Project management, consistency and degree of co-financing
E1. Degree of co-financing 
E2. Tools for project monitoring 
E3. Quality tools adopted in the project 
E4. Completeness of the information for the purposes of fairness economic 
evaluation  
E5. Reliability of the proponent 
E6. Quality of the work previously done 
F. Project management, consistency and degree of co-financing
F1. Degree of co-financing 
F2. Tools for project monitoring 
F3. Quality tools adopted in the project 
F4. Completeness of the information for the purposes of fairness economic evaluation  
F5. Reliability of the proponent 
F6. Quality of the work previously done 
Sources: regional resolutions n. 462/2000 and n. 1750/2004 
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Table A2. Correlation matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 SELECT 1
2 COFIN 0.01 1
3 MERIT 0.54 0.02 1
4 H-INDEX -0.09 0.074 0.050 1
5 SUITABILITY 0.46 0.08 0.65 -0.01 1
6 GENDERGROUP -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 0.069 -0.08 1
7 TIMESGROUP 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.114 -0.01 0.12 1
8 ANGEL  0.83 0.01 0.46 -0.146 0.41 -0.07 0.02 1
9 COST 0.02 0.91 0.07 0.068 0.11 -0.10 -0.01 0.03 1
10 VEG 0.06 -0.07 0.12 0.102 0.09 0.23 0.14 0.08 -0.04 1
11 MONTHS -0.08 0.44 0.07 0.167 0.07 0.03 0.09 -0.08 0.44 0.16 1
12 SUCCESSBEF 0.06 0.14 0.23 0.099 0.18 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.18 0.27 0.23 1
13 SUMBEF 0.07 0.17 0.23 0.093 0.19 -0.12 -0.01 -0.01 0.21 0.16 0.22 0.98 1
14 IB 0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.139 0.13 -0.02 0.16 0.03 -0.07 0.20 0.02 0.31 0.28 1
15 MALEPI -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.005 -0.02 0.08 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.07 1
16 GENDER_INTER -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 0.039 -0.05 0.73 0.12 -0.03 -0.07 0.19 0.04 -0.09 -0.11 0.06 0.69 1
17 ANGEL_INTER 0.43 -0.01 0.21 -0.016 0.20 0.03 0.70 0.52 -0.02 0.11 -0.00 -0.06 -0.06 0.15 0.06 0.08 1
18 YEAR -0.10 0.07 0.16 0.089 0.03 -0.08 -0.02 -0.13 0.16 0.02 0.15 0.51 0.52 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 -0.14 1
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Table A3. Results of the first stage: Probit estimates of Subset and Full Models (robust Standard Errors)  
(dependent variable: y = 1 if the project is selected, 0 otherwise)  
Variables 
Estimates Subset Models Estimates Full Model
1 2 3 4 
Explanatory variables 
Scientific merit (MERIT) 8.0622 *** 8.3965 *** 8.4323 *** 8.8308 *** 
(1.1287)  (1.1701)  (1.1722) (1.1958) 
Scientific status of the principal investigator(s) (H-INDEX) 0.0169 0.0169 0.0148 0.0170 
(0.0181)  (0.0185)  (0.0194) (0.1966) 
Suitability and integration with the regional context (SUITABILITY) 6. 3039 *** 5.9800 *** 6.0976 *** 6.2701 *** 
(0.9527)  (0.9907) (1.000) (0.9710) 
Percentage of males in the group of reviewers (GENDERGROUP) (b)  0.4408 0.6135 1.6783 ** 1.8852 ** 
(0.3781)  (0.4013)  (0.8860) (0.8501) 
Number of times the same triad has reviewed projects before (TIMESGROUP) (c) 0.0235 0.0201 0.0819 *** 0.0769 *** 
(0.0193)  (0.0193)  (0.0285) (0.0289) 
Number of times the triad has provided a positive evaluation in the past (ANGEL) (d) 4.9220 *** 5.20852 *** 5.9732 *** 5.8574 *** 
(0.3155)  (0.3647)  (0.4667) (0.4621) 
Control variables 
Quota of funds requested on the total amount of funds provided by the Region that year (COST)  -0.0775 -0.0784 -0.0628 
 (0.0804)  (0.0851) (0.0803) 
Project related to vegetable production (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) (VEG) -0.4441 ** -0.4763 ** -0.5364 ** 
 (0.2053)  (0.2136) (0.2128) 
Number of projects granted previously to the proponent institution (SUCCESSBEF) 0.0023 0.0018 0.0046 ** 
 (0.0018)  (0.0018) (0.0021) 
Project proposed by regional research centres acting as intermediary (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise) (IB) 0.2793 0.3286 0.2480 
 (0.2184)  (0.2214) (0.2216) 
Percentage of principal investigators in a given proposal that are male (MALEPI) (a)  -0.1380 0.7141 0.8791 
 (0.2826)  (0.7045) (0.6955) 
Interaction terms  
Interaction among (a) and (b)    -1.2466 -1.4473 
 (0.9765)  (0.9525) 
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(continue table A3) 
Interaction among (c) and (d)   -0.1251  ** -0.1170 ** 
Dummy for the change in the law  (0.0489) (0.0491) 
Year that the change in regulation took place (1 = 2005, 2006; 0 = otherwise) (YEAR) -0.6492 *** 
(0.2420) 
Const  -12.3750 *** -12.3681 *** -13.5422 *** -13.9244 *** 
(1.2177)  (1.2806)  (1.4312) (1.4332) 
Observations:  871 868 868 868 
McFadden's Pseudo R2: 0.7889 0.7940 0.7969 0.8027 
Wald chi2(12): 271.80 240.93 235.41 244.53 
Prob > chi2: 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Multicollinearity condition number  18.72   24.7112   48.9361 49.746 
***, **,: statistically significant at 1% and 5% confidence level, respectively 
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Table A4. Results of the second stage: Regression estimates (robust Standard Errors)  
(dependent variable: co-financing given to selected projects by the Region)  
Variable
Estimates Subset Models Estimates Full Model
1 2 3 4 
Explanatory variables 
Scientific merit (MERIT) 77525.10 95444.67 *** 93722.26 *** 99272.3 *** 
(73215.73)  (25578.86)  (25556.3) (25339.7) 
Scientific status of the principal investigator(s) (H-INDEX) 2886.21 119.797  44.52 153.421 
(1497.94) (558.31)  556.68 (557.396) 
Suitability and integration with the regional context (SUITABILITY) 395157.9 *** 132840.9 *** 134946.6 *** 136482 *** 
(74210.95)  (25062.52)  (24951.3) (24350.8) 
Percentage of males in the group of reviewers (GENDERGROUP) (b) -12594.60 8257.654 41252.6 ** 36120.65 ** 
(18245.26)  (8723.737)  (15919.1) (14479) 
Control variables 
Quota of funds requested on the total amount of funds provided by the Region that year (COST)  115003.9 *** 114530.6 *** 113850.2 *** 
 (7198.85) (7211.8) (7137.19) 
Project related to vegetable production (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) (VEG) 538.32   965.66 -350.43 
(5455.4)  (5467.23) (5430.80) 
Duration of the proposed projects (MONTHS) 178.65 200.04 205.91 
(217.71)  (214.9) (212.97) 
Total amount of funds that had been awarded to the proponent institution in the past (SUMBEF) -0.0012 *** -0.0013 *** -0.0002 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Project proposed by regional research centres acting as intermediary between science and practice (IB) 1804.80 2820.8 1124.40 
(3529.5) (3586.1) (3626.2) 
Percentage of principal investigators in a given proposal that are male (a) (MALEPI) -6640.67 16983.8 13766.3 
(5791.9)  (11428.6) (11103.7) 
Interaction terms  
Interaction among (a) and (b)  -40858.5 **  -35803.7 ** 
(18256.0) (16669.2) 
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Dummy for the change in the law 
Year that the change in regulation took place (1 = 2005, 2006; 0 = otherwise) (YEAR) -25469.9 *** 
(6343.7) 
lambda1 20333.82 * 
(13436.53) 
lambda2 13082.2 *** 
(4962.8) 
lambda3 13493.6 *** 
lambda4 (5180.4) 12770.7 ** 
(5262.3) 
Const  -223038.2 ** -148334 *** -167107.8 *** -167188.9 *** 
(87794.63)  (30474.3)  (31044.4) (30284.2)  
Observations:  412 411   411   411 
McFadden's Pseudo R2: 0.0980 0.8552 0.8568 0.8621 
Multicollinearity condition number  35.5680 51.2176   55.7769   56.6188   
***, **: statistically significant at 1% and 5%  confidence level, respectively 
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Figure 1 – ERR research proposal selection and funding process 
